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After more than fifteen years, attempts to merge the theoretical insights of 
poststructuralism with the practice of history continue to be fraught with conten-
tion, hyperbole, and misunderstanding. Articles by advocates of poststructuralism 
describe historians as epistemologically naive at best, at worst willfully blind. 
Defenders of traditional historical practice, on the other hand, castigate 
poststructuralism as linguistic tyranny, a perverse refusal to recognize the 
difference between language and reality. Charges of hubris and arrogance 
devolve on both sides. Even the most clear and even-toned discussions refer to 
"important and irreconcilable" differences between poststructuralism and his-
tory. No grounds seem to exist for bringing together the anti-foundationalist 
project of poststructuralism with the historical concern for past experience.1 
As one committed to understanding the past, yet who sees himself neither as 
a historian—traditionally understood—nor a poststructuralist, I have long been 
baffled by this intense disciplinary rivalry. From my perspective as one trained 
in American Studies, these two frameworks of intellectual inquiry share both 
motive and methodology, and each offers the other complementary strengths.2 
For instance, proponents of both deconstruction and social history proffer 
devastating critiques of philosophical and cultural idealism.3 In addition, both 
poststructuralism and history demand close, careful reading of texts or, if you 
prefer, documents. On the basis of these shared philosophical and methodologi-
cal imperatives, I believe that it is possible to imagine a poststructuralist history 
that would combine the strengths of both endeavors. In this essay, I want to 
suggest how the reconceptualization of a few key terms and a reconsideration of 
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the rhetoric of both history and poststructuralism might result in a more self-
reflexive history and a strategically grounded and, therefore, more effectively 
persuasive poststructuralism. 
Rather than recapitulate the entire debate, from the early publications of 
Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra on, let me begin with a more recent 
discussion.4 In 1991, Lawrence Stone ignited yet another volatile skirmish over 
this contested territory with the publication of a brief note in the journal, Past and 
Present. Avowedly defending history from the threats represented by 
deconstruction, symbolic anthropology and new historicism, Stone defined "the 
subject matter of history" as "events and behaviors," the "data" of history as 
"contemporary texts," and the "problem" or task of history as "explanation of 
change over time." Stone worried that history (defined in this fashion as discrete 
events, texts, and explanations) was in the process of becoming an "endangered 
species," driven out of existence by the above-named linguistic predators.5 
Two issues later, the same journal printed two replies to Stone's note. In one 
of these comments, Patrick Joyce argued that "the major advance of 'post-
modernism' needs to be registered by historians: namely that the events, struc-
tures, and processes of the past are indistinguishable from the forms of documen-
tary representation, the conceptual and political appropriations, and the historical 
discourses that construct them."6 According to Joyce, the chief effect of the 
"linguistic turn" or "post-modernism"—or what I am calling poststructuralism— 
is to question the a priori distinction between the subject matter of history and the 
combination of data and interpretation used to represent it. 
In his response to Joyce, Stone worried that eliminating the distinction 
between the past and its representations would lead to an intolerable condition. 
"Where [Stone and Joyce] part company...is at the extreme stage, when reality is 
defined purely as language. This is because if there is nothing outside the text, 
then history as we have known it collapses altogether, and fact and fiction become 
indistinguishable from one another." As part of his effort to defend this 
distinction between fact and fiction, reality and language, text and "outside the 
text," Stone listed a set of methodological principles for the traditional practice 
of history. Included among these principles were the propositions that "historical 
truth is unattainable, and that any conclusions are provisional and hypothetical;" 
that "we [that is, historians] are all subject to bias and prejudice because of our 
race, class and culture," therefore, the background of the historian is an important 
factor to consider when evaluating any history; and, finally, that "documents... were 
written by fallible human beings who made mistakes, asserted false claims, and 
had their own ideological agenda which guided their compilation," consequently, 
these documents ought to be read critically and interpreted carefully.7 
While very few historians or poststructuralists would disagree with the 
methodological implications of Stone's set of principles, the vast majority of 
practicing historians would balk at Joyce's insistence on the impossibility of 
distinguishing between past events and historical discourses, while every self-
respecting poststructuralist would reject Stone's categorical distinction between 
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reality and representation. It seems to me, therefore, that the important but 
nevertheless reconcilable differences between traditional historical concerns and 
methods and the anti-foundationalism of poststructuralism lie in the space 
mapped out between these boundary-defining positions. To assert that past 
events are not distinguishable from historical discourses, however, is not to say 
that reality is nothing but language or that there is no difference between fact and 
fiction. Rather, it is to suggest that the relationship between language and reality 
is too complicated and too interactive to allow for any assumption of an 
immediately evident categorical distinction between the subject matter of history 
and the data, the language, the discourse, that represent it. A necessary conse-
quence of this belief is that past events, texts, and explanations do not exist as 
discrete entities prior to the work of the historian. Ironically, however, this 
interactive commingling of language and reality serves not to limit but to 
reinforce the necessity and importance of the historian's effort to establish both 
the distinctions and the relevant connections among text, context, and event.8 
In their introduction to a recent collection of essays devoted to exploring new 
directions in American cultural history, Richard Fox and Jackson Lears assert that 
"[a]n emphasis on the inescapable textuality of all sources, even census rolls and 
market research reports, has freed historians from a positivist conception of data 
retrieval and focused their attention on the fundamental task of interpretation."9 
This statement appears to push forward from the somewhat static positions of 
Stone and Joyce. As Fox and Lears see it, unproblematic data are not simply lying 
in an archive somewhere waiting to be discovered; interpretation has a determi-
native effect on the material that can be mustered as evidence. Indeed, a 
recognition of the textuality of all historical sources goes a long way towards 
operationalizing Patrick Joyce's intermingling of discourse and event. Yet two 
pages later in the same introduction, a contradictory proposition appears—one 
that, perhaps, should not be so surprising. Here the editors of The Power of 
Culture underline one of their goals for the collection. "We aim to suggest how 
historians can, whatever period or group or theme they are studying, attend both 
to the 'textual' —visual as well as verbal— character of our knowing and to the 
broad structures of power that constitute the 'real' social world in which our 
knowing takes place (though of course that world is known to us only through the 
social constructions of it that are available to us)."(p.5) 
The distinction that is maintained here is chiefly the familiar though 
discomforting distinction between knowledge and the world. But it is accompa-
nied by a common chain of equivalences that articulates some of the unfortunate 
consequences that follow from the traditional understanding of this distinction. 
On one hand we are to acknowledge the undeniable textual character of our 
knowing. On the other hand stands the real, the social, the world, each of which 
is constituted by "broad structures of power." This formulation produces a tragic 
role for the historian, doomed to a dependence on the inadequacy of textual 
knowledge when faced with the overwhelming real social world of power.10 The 
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editors of The Power of Culture want to acknowledge the effects of textuality, but 
they want to constrain those effects—figured as debilitating—to the realm of the 
historian, the intellectual, the knower. The real social world of power is not 
affected by textuality in this formulation. 
While the problems inherent in this version of the classic dualism are evident, 
I want to make it abundantly clear that I am not making the reductive claim that 
everything is a text. What I am saying is that an a priori distinction between the 
textual and the real is not productive. Historians cannot afford to operate in a 
world where textual knowing is assumed to line up on one side, while the real 
social world of power stands on the other. Distinguishing between and determin-
ing the relationships among text and context is the vital rhetorical task of 
historians. To begin this task with such a fissured conception of the real—with 
the belief that any context could somehow escape the effects of textuality— 
simply eviscerates the work of history. 
It might be helpful to reconsider this matter using slightly different words, 
such as the distinction between "meaning" and "experience." Stepping back from 
the epistemological quagmire produced by a categorical separation between 
knowledge and the real, some historians have turned to the concept of experience 
as a mediating term within which discursive construction can meet material 
conditions. For instance, Fox and Lears state that "one of the most basic truths 
of the new cultural history [is] that experience is mediated by language, that our 
access to experience in the past as in the present is decisively shaped by its 
encoding in particular rhetorical conventions."(p.5) 
According to historian Joan Scott, however, this way of formulating expe-
rience simply introduces a new undefined term that can take the place of the more 
traditional historical foundation of past events and behaviors. "'Experience' is 
one of the foundations that has been reintroduced into historical writing in the 
wake of the critique of empiricism," she writes in an important historiographical 
essay that was first published in a literary journal. "It has recently emerged as a 
critical term in debates among historians about the limits of interpretation and 
especially about the uses and limits of post-structuralist theory for history." Scott 
further asserts that "those most open to interpretive innovation"—for example, 
cultural historians such as Fox and Lears—"are among the most ardent defenders 
of the need to attend to 'experience.'" While data and interpretation might have 
become intermingled and, in practice, quite difficult to distinguish from each 
other, Scott argues that historians have begun to rely on the concept of experience 
itself as the subject matter of the historian's research—the pre-existing object of 
and foundation for any interpretive meaning.11 
Among the "experiential foundationalists" Scott discusses is John Toews. In 
his oft-cited review essay, "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn," Toews 
distinguishes between meaning and experience, presenting the construction of 
meaning as a response to "changing worlds of experience ultimately irreducible 
to the linguistic forms in which they appear." Scott reads this formulation as the 
assertion of experience prior to meaning and, therefore, the construction of 
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experience as a foundationalist term, an absolute ground, an unquestioned and 
unquestionable transcendental signified. It seems clear to me that Scott has 
misread Toews here, just as Stone misread Joyce above. At another point in his 
essay, Toews characterizes the relationship between meaning and experience as 
follows: "[Experience is not simply given but already worked over and mediated 
by language and thus as much an object of interpretation as the texts in the history 
of discourse." While Toews stands on the irreducibility of experience to meaning, 
Scott suggests that historians should acknowledge "the discursive nature of 
'experience'," asserting that: "Experience is at once always already an interpre-
tation and something that needs to be interpreted." These two positions—equally 
true and equally partial—narrow further the focus on the point where I believe the 
differences between history and poststructuralism can be usefully reconciled.12 
Both poststructuralism and history would benefit from acknowledging that 
while there might be aspects to any experiential moment that resist meaningful 
analysis, even that situation of resistance is a discursively enabled and textually 
interpreted condition, deriving, for example, from the distance (discursively as 
well as materially produced) between the lived subjective experience of the 
historian or analyst and the moment of past experience being described. For 
example, as the material conditions and the disciplinary rules that enable and 
legitimate historical practice change, the process of translating past knowledge 
into present knowledge changes, and, in effect, produces transformations in the 
qualities or aspects of the past that are knowable or unknowable. The result of 
these ongoing changes is that what we call "the real" in history is often that which 
resists our understanding, not by virtue of some categorical distinction (as with 
some a priori difference, say, between power and knowledge or language and 
life), but as an effect of the unending development of our attempts to understand 
the past.13 The question remains: why do historians, time and again, insist on 
repeating this philosophically problematic distinction between meaning and 
experience, knowledge and power, text and context, or language and life? 
The short answer is, for the purpose of argument. Reference to some version 
of a non-textualized real has long been a rhetorical strategy common to the 
practice of history. Within traditional historical writings, this distinction between 
text and a non-textualized real stands as the basis for determining the legitimacy 
of the interpretive work of the historian—the necessary means of determining the 
difference between "fact" and "fiction." An insistence on the real status of past 
events and behaviors is the definitive mark of history for Lawrence Stone. An 
emphasis on a real that is irreducible to meaning forms the basis of John Toews's 
call for a "renewed focus on the experiential component in the dynamic, mutually 
implicated polarities of meaningful experience." The editors of The Power of 
Culture find a reference to the real social world of power to be a necessary means 
towards legitimating their essays as history.14 
As Scott points out, this distinction between textualized knowledge and the 
real social world of power becomes even more important for those historians for 
whom the distinction between data and interpretation is no longer clear cut. For 
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one example of the increased rhetorical importance of the insistance on a 
nontextualized real, let us turn to Saul Cornell's critique of Michael Warner. In 
a crucial section of his Letters of the Republic, Warner argues that the Antifederalist 
Amos Singletary misunderstood the relationship between Federalist discourse 
and the technological and ideological conditions within which this discourse was 
being formed and distributed. Asserting that the structure of the bourgeois public 
sphere, not individual greed, was the determinative condition for Federalist 
rhetoric, Warner brings to his late twentieth-century interpretation a perspective 
that an eighteenth century Antifederalist could not have consciously shared. 
Rather than disagreeing with this interpretation or raising an argument about the 
relative value of differing textualized contexts, Cornell insists that Warner has 
failed to understand a more fundamental distinction. "By failing to distinguish 
between textual/discursive reality (the rhetoric of Singletary's attack on the 
Federalists) and social reality (the class relations in Massachusetts during 
ratification as identified by Singletary) Warner prevents us from appreciating the 
way that Antifederalist discourse sought to comprehend an extradiscursive 
reality." In an analogy quite common in historical writings, the distinction 
between rhetoric and class relations has become equivalent to the distinction 
between discourse and extradiscursive reality. The analytical construct of class 
is misunderstood as an extradiscursive social reality, and the rhetorical force of 
Cornell's critique of Warner is inflated by this unnecessary categorical distinc-
tion between language and a non-textualized real.15 
Nevertheless, in terms of its argumentative power, reference to the real is 
obviously a useful move. Poststructuralists might applaud the philosophical rigor 
of thinking and writing without such a strategy, but the persuasiveness of their 
arguments (outside of the discourse of philosophy itself) suffers from its absence. 
References to "experience" or any other figure for the real must be understood as 
the means whereby the work of historians acknowledges its necessary textuality 
while still indicating the limits of the knowledge it produces. "The real" is an 
unreachable limit; the gestures used to point towards that limit indicate the 
historian's awareness of that limit. The importance of these moves, however, 
does not obviate the necessity of submitting them to rigorous critical examina-
tion. Determining the effectiveness of this rhetorical reference to the real enables 
relative evaluations of the persuasiveness of the historical argument. And it is 
precisely the basis and the validity of any such claims on the real that will be 
strengthened by the self-reflexive rhetorics of a poststructuralist history. 
Within the historical text, any reference to the real provides the key moment 
at which to begin to evaluate the persuasiveness of the argument. In this way, the 
status of the claim on the historical real does lay the foundation for the interpretive 
work of the historian. To this extent, Joan Scott's critique is correct. Where her 
critique errs, however, is in the assumption that these claims on the historical real 
always go unquestioned, always function as a transcendental signified. Despite 
overt statements to the contrary by some of its practitioners, the methodology of 
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history recognizes the tentative nature of these claims. In fact, much historical 
debate centers on their validity. One notorious example of a debate of this type 
concerns the controversy over the economic analysis of slavery delivered in 
Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman's Time on the Cross.16 
Time on the Cross was released in 1974 in two volumes, and the division 
between the two emphasized the distinction between data and interpretation. The 
first volume, subtitled The Economics of American Negro Slavery, contains the 
bulk of the historical argument and interpretation. Throughout this first volume, 
however, the authors refer to the second volume, Evidence and Methods, which 
contains a mass of cliometric data—statistical analyses of information derived 
from the disciplines of demography and economics. The persuasiveness of Fogel 
and Engerman's historical work was based on a privileged claim on the real that 
was represented by means of the social scientific data and analyses its authors had 
mustered. A brief introduction to this second volume spelled out the authors' 
belief in the greater representative accuracy of their work. 
The battle to disentangle private prejudices and objective 
knowledge is unending...The problem of disentangling knowl-
edge from belief is still more acute in the discipline of history ...If 
we had confined our consideration of the economics of slavery 
purely to what can be achieved with the methods of the social 
sciences, this book would have been limited to appendix B 
[which] brings together many of the principal findings of 
cliometricians regarding slavery... Where hard evidence was 
lacking on issues vital to the interpretation of slavery, we, like 
historians who preceded us, were forced into speculation. By 
taking advantage of the extensive quantitative work of the 
cliometricians, however, we have been able to reduce signifi-
cantly the number of issues on which speculation was the only 
option.17 
The principal findings of cliometricians equal hard evidence, objective knowl-
edge, the opposite of speculation, a privileged claim on the real. This objective 
knowledge, then, stood as the basis for the arguments found in Time on the Cross. 
This privileged claim on the real also became the basis of a book-length 
review of the work written by Herbert Gutman and originally published in the 
Journal of Negro History in 1975. In his review, Gutman insisted that "detailed 
examination of T/C—its major arguments and the evidence supporting them— 
shows convincingly that it is poor social history."18 It is important to make clear 
that Gutman was not arguing against the validity of social scientific data or 
analyses in historical writings. Gutman's acceptance of and familiarity with 
social scientific methods for constructing historical evidence, rather, enabled him 
to critique the methods whereby the data were compiled, the models of behavior 
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that marked off certain bodies of data as immediately relevant to the argument, 
as well as the interpretations that Fogel and Engerman drew from their analyses. 
Gutman's attack on Time on the Cross was considered to be so devastating not 
because he dismissed their evidence as categorically inaccurate, but because he 
respected that particular type of evidence and therefore focused his critique 
precisely on the validity of the argument based on it. In other words, for Gutman' s 
critique to have the force it did, it had to begin from the textualized nature of the 
claim on the real that had been produced through the disciplinary discourse of 
cliometrics. As the controversy over Time on the Cross makes clear, any "real" 
that a work of history refers to—whether figured as economic statistics or "broad 
structures of power"—is already textualized in this fashion. That is, the very 
possibility of referring to this necessarily textualized real as extratextual, as 
"real," is an effect of a certain way of making knowledge and constructing 
arguments—strategies which are crucial to the practice of history. 
For historians who use cultural evidence in their arguments, the advances of 
poststructuralist theory are a necessary means toward achieving a sufficiently 
subtle and nuanced reference to a textualized real. Yet many of those who profess 
a desire to "grapple with the implications of poststructuralist theory" and whose 
work does indeed show the effects of this grappling find it necessary to mark off 
some territory as safe from the effects of textualization. Jackson Lears introduces 
his contribution to The Power of Culture, "Sherwood Anderson—Looking for the 
White Spot," by describing his position on the intersection of poststructuralism 
and history. Although he finds much of value in the "antifoundationalist 
movements in philosophy and literary criticism," Lears is impatient with 
poststructuralism's "reflex dismissal of any concern with authentic experience as 
little more than vestigial essentialism."19 
Lears then allows authentic experience to function as the central motif within 
the essay, but he does so with a curious double purpose. On the one hand, Lears 
suggests that a discourse of authenticity might function as an "honorable 
standpoint"(15) for cultural critics in the late twentieth century. On the other 
hand, he anchors this theoretical possibility in the way this discourse operates in 
the early twentieth-century writings of Sherwood Anderson. In the rhetoric of the 
essay, then, Anderson's longing for authentic experience links the work of late 
twentieth-century cultural critics to a "persistent search for some reliable onto-
logical bedrock"(16) from which can safely be viewed the swirling mists of a 
textualized world. In a wonderfully deft yet wide-ranging argument, Lears 
constructs a genealogy of this discourse of authenticity, showing how it has been 
part of an American resistance to modernization shared by seventeenth-century 
Calvinist divines and eighteenth-century republican propagandists as well as 
twentieth-century modernist writers. Anderson's specific use of this discourse is 
then shown to have been shaped by his "immersion in a particular historical 
situation that accounted for [his] interpretive power."(37) Throughout the piece, 
Lears carefully and persuasively distinguishes the complex relationships among 
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multiple texts and diverse contexts, refraining from privileging either Anderson's 
published fiction or his private letters and reminiscences, always reading each 
against the other. 
When the article comes to an end, however, at the very moment when I 
wanted him to link explicitly his own search for authenticity to this same 
religious, republican, and bohemian discourse, Lears chooses instead to repeat a 
troubling image from Anderson's writings. As he does so, Lears puts forth the 
possibility that Anderson's 
fascination with "the dance of life" in his Italian neighbors' 
garden suggests the centrality of a biological or ecological 
dimension to that desire for connectedness. As he stared out 
from his bedroom window, losing himself in contemplation of 
the yard next door, Anderson may have glimpsed a fundamen-
tal insight: all our cultural constructions—our longings for the 
white spot of eternal harmony, our dances of life and death— 
are rooted in the earth, the ground of being. That may be one 
reality that, try as we might, we cannot contain in quotation 
marks. (37) 
This conclusion confirms the tragic view of history derived from an insistence on 
the categorical distinction between the real and the textual. In line with the 
discourse of authenticity, biology becomes the ontological bedrock of a reality 
that cannot be contained in quotation marks. Ethnic difference is then ranked by 
means of the classic opposition between nature and culture, where the more 
natural becomes the more real while greater social power is reserved for the more 
cultural—the man longing for the white spot who stands staring out the window. 
As Lears uses this image to anchor the discourse of authenticity, Anderson's 
longing becomes "our longings"; we are encouraged to identify with Lears who 
is identifying with Anderson. In the process, we are positioned to assent to a 
rhetorical construct that represents the pleasures of an Italian family as more real 
because they are more natural, more biological, less cultural, less textual. 
In the process of arguing for the validity of the discourse of authenticity as 
an honorable standpoint for late twentieth century cultural critics, Jackson Lears 
has shown us exactly why it cannot function in that way. The discourse of 
authenticity places the real outside of culture. It then bewails its own culture 
which is defined as incapable of being real. It then imagines a more real culture 
which, according to the terms of its discourse, must be more natural. Finally, it 
manages to feel superior to this more natural culture (a very common trope 
signifying this superiority is that of looking down from a window onto the 
pleasures of the other) by virtue of the classical opposition between culture and 
nature. Within the discourse of authenticity, the longing for an untextualized real 
masks the real social power that textual mastery provides.20 
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To return to Lawrence Stone's definition of history, the project of explaining 
change over time is not forwarded by the maintenance of past events and 
behaviors, or of any other "real," as sterile entities, prophylactically protected 
from the virus of textual interpretation. The production of knowledge regarding 
past events and behaviors, even the lived experience of past events and behaviors, 
is radically dependent upon the determinedly textualized effects of interpretation. 
All references to a past real are the result of a claimed privileged relation 
between one mode of signifying and a past mode of being. Following from his 
familiarity with poststructuralist thought, the privileged mode for Lears is figured 
as a discourse (unfortunately, a discourse based on a certain biological determin-
ism and a corresponding ethnic romanticism). Traditionally, however, this 
privileged mode of signifying has been termed "primary documents." Within the 
past thirty years, social and economic statistics have achieved this privileged 
status. Historians working with material culture are developing new ways of 
interpreting artifacts that bring them into the sacred circle. Current movements 
in cultural history are developing arguments for including novels, films, even 
radio and television programs, and popular music within the realm of historical 
evidence—always and only as textualized representations of a past mode of 
being. Historical training traditionally has and continues to focus on the ability 
to read, interpret, and critique such privileged modes of signifying. We are 
trained in the practice of conjuring evidence for experience. 
Once this process of reading and interpreting begins, however, it becomes 
theoretically unending. The endless deferral of meaning suggested by 
poststructuralism and made evident in the antifoundational process of reading 
and interpreting historical evidence is, however, deeply unsatisfying. For the 
purposes of argument and persuasion, some closure must be reached and some 
conclusions must be, however tentatively, drawn. This is the purpose of the 
concept of the real in historical writing. However it might be metaphorically 
represented—whether as class relations, cliometric statistics, or biological deter-
minism—reference to the real becomes a rhetorical tool used to justify and 
buttress a particular mode of interpretation of already existing textualized 
interpretations, with the aim of producing a persuasive argument. 
Persuasive claims about a past real are the goal and the purpose of historical 
work. But insofar as this is true, such claims must always be subject to a rigorous 
critique, not only of the historical text, but of the very practice of history that 
stands behind the historical text. Any such critique will be refined and sharpened 
by an insistence, not only on the textuality of all evidence, but also on the 
textuality of all experience—past and present. The autonomy of history as a 
discipline depends upon its concern with past experience, which in turn justifies 
its methodological procedures. In order to create more persuasive discussions of 
past experience, however, historians ought to acknowledge that any claims about 
the real are grounded not in the real, but indeed and wholly in other textualized 
statements of interpretation which have then been re-interpreted by the historian. 
The curious result of this turning of the philosophical spiral is not the abandon-
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ment of history as a meaningless project. It is not the conflation of text and 
context. It is not the refusal to recognize the difference between language and life. 
Rather, the acknowledgment of the fundamental work of interpretation reinforces 
the vital importance of history as a primary discipline for constructing persuasive 
claims about the social real. 
Recognizing the anti-foundational status of historical interpretation results 
in a necessary intensification of the existing methodological principles which 
already undergird the practice of history. Not only must historians remember that 
"truth is unattainable," we must continue to hold persuasive argumentation as our 
goal. Not only must historians consider the effect of the "biases and prejudices" 
of other historians, we have to take into account the relations between our own 
discursively produced subject positions and our subject matter. Not only must 
historians acknowledge the ideological construction of our evidence, but we have 
to account for the ideological construction of our own approach to that evidence 
and whatever disciplinary rules allow that evidence to appear and to function as 
such. Finally, historians must recognize that all we have to work with is 
textualized interpretation, but this in itself does not differentiate our work from 
that of government workers, corporate executives, automobile mechanics, medi-
cal doctors, or primary care-givers. In other words, the world is not divided into 
textualized knowledge and real structures of power, language and life. The nearly 
impossible task of the historian is to create so persuasive a presentation of past 
experience that it appears "real" to the reader's mind. The only means to the 
accomplishment of this end is through a powerful devotion to craft—one that is 
not afraid to acknowledge the virtually molecular bonding of the textual and the 
real. 
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